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Introduction
Equities are concentrated in the hands of households at the top of the U.S. income distribution. 1 One might therefore expect that changes in their labor and capital incomes a¤ect the movements in asset prices. Both labor and capital shares of income of the U.S. richest households increased during the last …ve decades, which was accompanied by large shifts in returns from risky assets. The equity premium, which was as high as 9% during the …rst 25 years after the war, dropped to below 6%, on average, since the early 1970s. In this paper, we study the relationship between income inequality and stock market returns. We develop a general equilibrium model that links shifts in both labour and capital income inequality to stock market variables and investigate in how far these shifts could explain the fall in equity returns.
Our model includes two groups of agents. The top income group (capital owners) owns 100% of the economy's …nancial wealth-a setup that roughly approximates the highly-skewed distribution of U.S. …nancial wealth. 2 The rest of the economy is populated by workers who consume their labor income and income from risk-free government and corporate bonds. This set-up is similar to Greenwald et al. (2016) .
The key di¤erence of our model is that, in addition to the capital income, capital owners earn labor income, in line with empirical observation that the top wealth holders of today are also the top earners. Saez and Zucman (2016) show that in 2012 the top 0.1% of wealth holders earned 31 times the average labor income and their pre-tax income share almost tripled between 1960 and 2012.
Our model provides a simple intuition on how shifts in income inequality, as measured by changes in income shares, a¤ect asset pricing variables and, in particular, the equity premium. An increase in the share of risky capital in income and, hence, in consumption of capital owners leads to a higher equity premium. The opposite is true when the share of non-risky labor income in the total income of capital owners rises. However, according to the data, capital owners bene…ted from increase in both incomes over the last four decades. As a result, the total quantitative impact of income inequality shifts on the stock market return is unclear. 3 We build a quantitative model that allows us to assess the impact of the joint 1 Chen and Sta¤ord (2016) argue that even fewer than 20 percent of households own stock directly. 2 The share of total …nancial wealth owned by the top 10% of households is around 80% in the sample period (Wolf, 2010) . 3 The total share of income of capital owners or, equivalently in our model, top decile earners, in the U.S. increased from 32% to 47% between 1970 and 2014 as shown in Figure 1 , top panel. Both, top decile labor and capital shares increased during this period as shown in Figure 2 . 1 increases in capital and labor income shares of the top decile of the U.S. income distribution on the stock market. The model extends the standard RBC setting used in the production-based (CCAPM) literature allowing for heterogeneity of agents, which di¤er by their ability to hold …nancial assets and having di¤erent output elasticities of labor. This set-up turns out su¢ cient to broadly match both, stock market and real economy statistics.
The source of macroeconomic risk in the model is a standard technology shock.
The model delivers high mean equity premium and realistic Sharpe ratio via a combination of three factors. First, to generate a high price for risk, following Greenwald et al. (2016) , we introduce high and time-varying coe¢ cient of risk-aversion in capital owners'utility function. Second, capital is subject to adjustment costs in the spirit of Uhlig (2007) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) . Finally, …nancial leverage of …rms increases the quantity of risk borne by capital owners thus helping to generate a realistic Sharpe ratio. Careful calibration of these channels allows for precise matching of the mean and standard deviation of equity premium (and hence the Sharpe ratio), which has proven a challenge in models that use other mechanisms. Additionally, introducing …nancial leverage pins down the non-zero rate of risk-free savings on the side of consumers, which increases the realism of the model. We calibrate the model to the U.S. post-war economy when the equity premium of S&P500 shares reached 7.03%. In order to gauge the quantitative impact of changes in income inequality on the equity premium, we carry out three counterfactual scenarios.
First, we consider an increase in capital income inequality and change the value of capital share of income, from its baseline value of 0.28 to 0.34, its empirical value in 2014. This increase leads to the mean equity premium that is higher by 0.43 percentage points than the historical average. Second, we raise the value of the labour share of income of top decile from 3:5% to 13%, its 2014 value. We show that the steady increase of the capital owners'labour share between 1970 and 2014 should have exercised a strong downward pressure on the equity premium. In fact, the model predicts that if there was no increase in capital income inequality, but only in labour income, the equity premium would have been lower by 1.64 percentage points.
Finally, considering the two changes together, we show that the net e¤ect on the equity premium is negative, in line with what has been observed in the S&P500 data.
The reason is that, capital owners bene…ted from a faster growth in their non-risky labour income share relative to the risky capital income share bringing the equity 2 premium below the historical value by 0.79 percentage points.
Next, we construct scenarios for the size of the equity premium in 15 years from now, assuming that the U.S. income inequality continues increasing. We consider two di¤erent scenarios for future trends in income inequality and introduce them into the model to derive the equity premium response.
The …rst scenario assumes that both capital and total income shares of the top decile will grow at the same rate as between 1970 and 2014 until 2030, namely 0.5% and 0.92%, respectively. In this case, we …nd that the equity premium would continue decreasing to 6.11% in 2030, 0.92 percentage point lower than historical average. In the second, more likely scenario, we assume that the labour share of income of capital owners stops growing and only capital share of income continues to increase. 4 If capital share of income continues to grow at the annual rate of 0.5% and the labour share of income of top decile remains unchanged, capital would represent 37% of total income in the U.S. in 2030. Total income of top decile would amount to half of the income in the U.S. economy. In this scenario, the equity premium would be higher than the historical average by 0.57 percentage point.
Finally, we use the model to perform a reverse engineering exercise, in which we compute the income inequality required to reach the post-war average equity premia of 7.03% and 9.07%, starting from today's values. We make predictions about the behavior of one of the shares of income and compute a change in the other share required to match historical equity premium. If the labour income dispersion stops increasing, the historical equity premium of 7:03% would be reached by 2030 if capital share of income was growing by 1:4% each year, consistent with Piketty's (2014) predictions. If the equity premium was instead, to reach its value from immediately after the war of 9.07%, the capital share of income would need to grow at the annual into an otherwise standard RBC framework two types of consumers, which di¤er by their elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The latter element di¤erentiates these papers from our approach, in which we assume that the preferences of our two types of consumers are identical.
Our paper is probably most closely related to Lansing (2015) who, in an RBC setting, studies the consequences of short-term ‡uctuations in the capital income distribution. However, similar to the other papers mentioned above, the goal of Lansing (2015) is to explain the high post-war equity premium. In contrast, in this paper we focus on the longer-term, structural shifts in income shares and we link them to long-term trends observed in the equity premium and in particular its recent decline. Finally, we share the interest in the longer-term trends in income shares and their consequences for equity markets with Greenwald et al. (2016) . Our modelling strategy largely bene…ted from their set-up, namely, we use their risk aversion shock speci…cation to deliver a sizeable average equity premium. Unlike in Greenwald et al.
(2016), however, in our model capital owners are also high labour income earners. The latter element turns out to be crucial for explaining a part of the observed downward trend in the average equity premium.
By studying the link between income shares and asset returns, we also contribute to the fast-growing literature emphasizing the importance of wealth dispersion and resulting capital income inequality in the U.S. and other developed economies. Kacperczyk et al. (2016) show that capital income inequality is large and growing fast, accounting for a considerable portion of total income inequality in the U.S. In addition, Saez and Zucman (2016) demonstrate an increased correlation between top labor and top capital incomes in the U.S. data. Our framework is motivated by these resent empirical observations and therefore models capital owners also as high labor income earners.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe a set of stylized facts on changes in income inequality and equity premium. In Section 3, we describe the model and its main intuition. Speci…cally, we explain the mechanisms generating high equity premium and Sharpe ratio and how they respond to shifts in income shares. In this section, we also describe our calibration strategy. Section 4 evaluates the quantitative performance of the model in both macroeconomic and …nancial dimensions. In Section 5, we carry out a set of counterfactual exercises which allow us to assess the quantitative impact of the recent increase in income inequality on the equity premium. In this section, we also implement a number of scenarios for future behavior of equity premium based on the income inequality predictions. Section 6 concludes. Top incomes thus experienced an increase from both sources: capital and labor and, there is in fact, a strong positive correlation between top labor and capital incomes. The top wealth holders of today are also the top earners. 5 
Equity premium
While income inequality increased during the last …ve decades the equity premium has decreased. In Table 1 EP stands for equity premium and SR for Sharpe ratio. Both statistics are computed using the annual data from Shiller's website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Equity premium is computed as the di¤erence between the return including dividends on S&P 500 and the risk free rate is 6 months rolled commercial paper rate.
The following two rows report the statistics for the period before 1970 and after 1970. The equity premium before 1970 was a third higher than after 1970. In case 5 As previously mentioned, there is an increasing evidence that top labor and top capital incomes are strongly correlated. For instance, Saez and Zucman (2016) show that in 2012 the top 0.1% of wealth holders earned 31 times the mean labor income.
of the Sharpe ratio statistics, this pattern is even stronger as the value before 1970 is almost twice as high as after 1970.
Model
As our analytical tool we build on the model by Lansing and Markiewicz (2018) . The model extends the standard RBC setting used in the production-based Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) literature allowing for two types of agents di¤ering by their ability to hold …nancial assets and who face di¤erent output elasticities of the labor they provide. This extension to the standard framework lets us trace the impact of the shifts in the capital share and labor-income shares on the stock market price behavior and, in particular, on the mean equity premium.
There are several additional elements of the model worth emphasizing. The high mean equity premium and realistic Sharpe Ratio obtained in our setting are due to a combination of three factors: (i) time-varying coe¢ cient of risk aversion, as in Greenwald et al. (2016) , which increases the price for risk in the economy; and (ii) capital adjustment costs and (iii) …nancial leverage, which both increase the quantity of risk borne by the agents investing in stocks. Careful calibration of these channels allows for precise matching of the mean and standard deviation of equity premium (and hence the Sharpe Ratio), which has proven a challenge in models that use other mechanisms to generate high equity premium. 6 Additionally, introducing …nancial leverage pins down the non-zero rate of risk-free savings on the side of consumers, which increases the realism of the model. 7 
Workers
Workers, of mass 1 , maximize a discounted sum of utility over consumption, c w t :
the respective positions taken by workers in these assets. Workers are assumed to incur a transaction cost for trading stocks which prohibits their participation in stock exchange. 8 Finally, n w t = n w is the constant supply of labor hours per worker. Assuming the usual transversality condition, …rst order conditions for the worker's problem are standard:
with w t the worker's marginal utility of consumption and E t representing the mathematical expectation operator conditional on information at the end of period t. By de…nition, the returns on risk-free assets satisfy:
By construction we also have R c t R f t . Note that we implicitly assumed that …rms do not default on their debt.
Capital Owners
Capital owners, of mass , represent the top decile of income distribution. Similarly to workers, they maximize a discounted sum of utility over consumption, c c t ,
where c t is the capital owners'discount factor and c t is their coe¢ cient of risk aversion. The capital owners'coe¢ cient of risk aversion is time-varying, as in Greenwald et al. (2016) . In combination with technology shocks, which are the standard source of macroeconomic risk in our economy, shocks to the coe¢ cient of risk aversion increase the price for risk that is, the return on the risky asset, net of risk-free return, per unit of risk, as traditionally measured by the excess return's standard deviation.
In other words, they increase the Sharpe ratio.
The time-varying coe¢ cient of risk aversion is de…ned as
with c being the maximum degree of risk aversion and x t an autoregressive process of order 1 with mean x : x t x = x (x t 1 x ) + " x t and " x t an iid shock. The maximization is subject to a budget constraint:
Assuming the usual transversality condition, …rst order conditions for the capitalist's problem are:
with c t the marginal utility of consumption and R s t+1 is the next period return on stocks:
The form of the above …rst order conditions is very similar to the standard …rst order conditions dirived in the CCAPM literature. However, since risk-free assets are now held by two types of agents, whose consumption is allowed to display di¤erent dynamics, Euler equations of capital owners and workers associated with these assets , of the …rms' owners:
where K t is the end of period capital stock and N c t and N w t indicate demand for the capital owners'and workers'labor, respectively. Pro…ts are de…ned as:
Above, Y t is the current output, I t is total investment and measures the degree of …nancial leverage of …rms. When = 0, the new capital of a …rm is fully …-nanced through retained earnings. It will be assumed that pro…ts are redistributed via dividends to capital owners: 10 Output is produced with Cobb-Douglas technology:
where is the capital income share, (1 ) is the capital owners' share of labor income and z t = z t 1 + z + " z t is a TFP shock with possibly non-zero growth rate, z , and " z t is zero-mean N.I.D. It is assumed that transforming investment I t into capital K t is costly, which permits the shadow price of installed capital to diverge from the price of an additional unit of capital. In specifying the capital adjustment cost, we follow Uhlig (2007) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) so that the capital accumulation equation takes the form:
with function G ( ) such that
where a 1 ; a 2 are two positive constants. For < 1, adjustment costs become strictly positive.
Assuming transversality condition, …rst order conditions are as follows:
where return on capital, R k t , is de…ned as:
which can also be rewritten as
The return on capital has an intuitive interpretation, which will be presented below. 12 
Equilibrium market clearing conditions
In the equilibrium, all markets clear: Consumption goods market:
Goods market:
Labor market: is shown in Appendix A).
Asset Pricing Variables
We de…ne the equity premium (excess return on stocks):
The unconditional Sharpe ratio is then de…ned as:
t ] where E and stand for unconditional expectation and standard deviation, respectively. For the sake of completeness, we also de…ne price-dividend ratio pd t , the standard stock market diagnostic:
Finally, it is worth interpreting the Euler equation associated with capital. Comparing arbitrage conditions (8) and (15), we see that they imply
In a model without frictions, stock price, P s t , would be simply equal to capital stock per capita, K t . However, in our model, the price of installed and uninstalled capital di¤er. The adjustment term G 0
translates the value of installed capital into the uninstalled one. Moreover, stock owners own only a fraction 1 of capital stock, as they have to borrow from workers the funds to cover the remaining part of capital.
This is re ‡ected in the 1 G 0
adjustment term (again, with a suitable adjustment due to the price di¤erence between installed and unistalled capital).
3.6 Intuition of the model 3.6.1 Mechanisms generating high equity premium and Sharpe ratio
Our model is able to easily generate realistic equity premium and Sharpe ratio, and produce at the same time reasonable real-economy statistics. This is remarkable,
given the well-known fact that production-based CCAPMs struggle to achieve both While high and volatile coe¢ cient of risk aversion of capital owners makes it possible to produce almost arbitrarily high equity premium, it is not su¢ cient on its own to generate a realistic Sharpe ratio. Production-based CCAPMs tend to produce too small the quantity of risk, as measured by the unconditional standard deviation of excess returns. We introduce two mechanisms to deal with this problem. First, we assume that capital is subject to adjustment costs. This mechanism makes capital owners'consumption smoothing via adjustment in the level of corporate investment costlier, making them less keen on taking investment risks. Additionally, capital adjustment costs help us match the volatility of investment relative to output. Second, we also introduce a limited amount of …nancial leverage of …rms in the form of risk-14 free corporate debt. This multiplies the risk taken up by capital owners per each stock held.
Expected responses of equity premium to shifts in income shares
The objective of the paper is to examine the impact of shifts in income shares on the stock market variables and in particular on the equity premium. Using the model, we can make the following predictions. An increase in the capital income ratio, as governed by the production function parameter , will lead to an increase in the mean equity premium. The reason is that higher directly increases the volatility of return on capital, via (16) , which raises the riskiness of investment in stocks and hence increases the required excess return on stocks.
A shift in the labor income share of capital owners in total income,~ = (1 ),
has a less direct e¤ect. Combining the capital owners'budget constraint (7) with the de…nition of dividends (10), we can write capital owners'consumption as:
The …rst term on the RHS of (18) represents the total labour income of capital owners.
This is a part of capital owners'income that is relatively less risky. The second term is simply capital income, equal to total dividends income. This is the relatively more risky part of their income. From the above, it is clear that an upward shift in~ will decrease consumption risk faced by capital owners, by increasing the weight of the less risky component of capital owners'income. As a result, the volatility of the associated stochastic discount factor, M c t = we use a set of simulations of the model calibrated to the US economy to quantify the net e¤ect of these two simultaneous shifts. 11 
Computation
For solving the model, we use a non-linear solution method based on Coleman and Fenyes (1992) and following Davig (2004) and Lendvai and Raciborski (2014) . 12 The details of this procedure are described in Appendix A. In order to compute the statistical moments of macro and …nancial variables, for every model parametrization of interest we simulate the economy for 1.020.000. The moments reported are based on time series consisting of the last 1.000.000 observations. 13 
Calibration
Our calibration strategy is as follows. We calibrate most real economy parameters to re ‡ect certain empirical properties of the economy in the post-war period, see Table   2 . Parameter is calibrated to match the mean annual risk-free rate E R t f = 2%.
The share of capital owners in the population is equal to the top income decile. The remaining three real economy parameters (capital income share, , capital owners' labor income share in total labor income, ; and the ratio of capital owners to workers employment) are calibrated so that to match certain economy-wide characteristics in 1970 (see Table 2 ). Finally, the …nancial leverage parameter ( ) and risk aversion shock parameters ( c ; x ; x ; x ) are chosen to match a set of stock market statistics and are reported in Table 3 .
Starting from the real economy statistics, the value of z , is chosen such that the volatility of output growth in our economy matches its empirical counterpart of 2%
annually. The value of capital adjustment cost parameter, , is chosen to come close to the ratio of volatility of investment growth to volatility of output growth equal to 2:84. The remaining parameters in the capital adjustment cost function are speci…ed so that the steady state investment to capital ratio equals the depreciation rate and the …rst derivative of this function in investment-capital ratio is equal to 1, as in
Uhlig (2007) Table 3 reports baseline parameter values for stock market. The …nancial leverage, , and maximum risk aversion parameter, c , are calibrated to reproduce as closely as possible two fundamental stock market statistics, the mean equity premium, ER e t+1 = 7:03% and the Sharpe ratio, SR = 0:43; in the post-war S&P 500. We need a much lower maximum degree of capital owners'risk aversion than Greenwald et al. (2016) , c = 100. This also translates into a much lower mean degree of capital owners' risk aversion, which in our baseline calibration is E ( c t ) = 26. The main reason for this di¤erence is the assumption of a moderate degree of …nancial leverage, absent in to match the well documented long-horizon predictability of equity premium.
Quantitative Performance of the Model
We proceed as follows. We …rst simulate our model for the parameter calibration given in Tables 2 and 3 , and in particular, for the capital share of income = 0:28 and the share of capital owners' labor income in total labor income = 0:05. We assess its performance by comparing a set of model-based statistics with the data.
In order to study the impact of changes in income inequality on the equity premium, we then run 3 additional simulations. We …rst consider a rise in capital income inequality. We change the value of from its baseline value to 0:34 and study the impact of this increase on the mean equity premium. Second, we increase the value of to 13%, its 2014 value, and analyze the e¤ect of this change. Finally, similar to the trends in the data, we consider the joint shifts in the capital and labour shares of income. To isolate the impact of income shares shifts on the equity premium, we keep all the other parameters of the model unchanged.
Baseline scenario
We …rst discuss the performance of the baseline version of the model calibrated to the post-war U.S. real economy and S&P 500 index. In the top panel of Table 4 The …rst two rows of Table 4 report the average equity premium and Sharpe ratio. Our baseline model speci…cation reproduces the historical equity premium on the U.S. stock market and produces sizeable Sharpe ratio. The third and fourth rows of the same table display log price-dividend ratio, ln
Dt . While the model is able to match the volatility of the ratio, Since workers consume less on average, capital owners' consumption constitutes an important part of total consumption, despite the much lower number of them in the total population, so that total consumption volatility is strongly a¤ected by the volatility of capital owners'consumption.
In addition to the unconditional moments we compute the long-horizon predictability of equity premium based on the price-dividend ratio. We estimate a speci…cation of the following form:
where
R e t+j+1 is a cumulative excess return over h + 1 years with h = 0; 1; 2,
is price-dividend ratio at time t; and " t+1;t+h is the error term. The results of the estimation of this speci…cation for S&P 500 series are reported in the top panel of Table 5 while their model-based counterparts are displayed in the lower panel of the same table. We …nd that a drop in current price-dividend ratio predicts increase in the future cumulative excess returns both in the data and in the model. The absolute value of estimated coe¢ cient as well as R 2 increase in the horizon h. Equity premium, Sharpe ratio and price-dividend ratio are computed using the annual data from Shiller's website: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm. Equity premium is computed as the di¤erence between the return including dividends on S&P 500 and the risk free rate. Risk free rate is 6 months rolled commercial paper rate. Price-dividend ratio is calculated for S&P 500. Volatility is measured by standard deviation. x stands for growth rate in variable x. The real economy data is from FRED. Real output is proxied by real GDP, real investment by private non-residential …xed investment and consumption by real personal consumption expenditures. All the real economy variables are originally expressed in Billions of Chained 2009 Dollars and we compute their annual growth rates. 
is a cumulative excess return over h+1 years with h=0,1,2.
is price-dividend ratio at time t and " t+1;t+h is the error term. The speci…cation is estimated by OLS with Newey-West correction of the standard errors. Standard errors are reported in brackets. 21 
Increase in Income Inequality and Equity Premium
How did the trends in inequality a¤ect stock market and, in particular, equity premium? Between 1970 and 2014 the capital income share of top decile increased by 6 percentage points (from 28% to 34% of total U.S. income), while the top decile labor income share increased by about 9.5 percentage points (from 3.5% to 13% of total U.S. income). In order to gauge the impact of these shifts on equity premium, we simulate the model economy with higher income inequality observed in 2014. Speci…cally, we set the income share parameters to their 2014 steady state values. * denotes an increase in capital share of income and * an increase in the labour share of income of capital owners. The equity premium in the model is computed over 1.000.000 simulated periods. All the parameters of the model except for the ones included in the table are set to their baseline calibration values reported in Tables 2 and 3. As explained earlier (section 3:6:2), we expect shifts in the capital income and top decile labor income shares to have opposite e¤ects on equity premium. In order to test numerically this intuition, we …rst examine each income shift separately. First, we keep at its 1970 value but increase to match the 2014 value of the capital income share. Next, we do the opposite: we keep at its 1970 value, but increase to its 2014 level. Finally, to assess the total, quantitative impact of the simultaneous trends in income shares observed in the data, we introduce both shifts together. The results of these exercises are reported in Table 6 .
The …rst row shows the baseline model simulation outcomes where the equity premium equals 7:04% and the second row displays the results of the simulation with a higher capital income inequality as measured by increased : Increase in the share of income derived from the risky source, requires a higher return on the risky asset and translates into a higher equity premium. An increase in the capital share of income of 6 percentage points generates an increase in equity premium of 0:43 percentage points.
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The third row reports the results of the counterfactual with kept unchanged at its 1970 value, and set to its 2014 level. A 15 percentage points increase in translates into a large drop in equity premium of 1:64 percentage points. Unsurprisingly, considered simultaneously the shifts generate a drop in equity premium. An economy with higher shares of income, as observed in the U.S. data, displays equity premium of 6.25%. The reason is that, during the last …ve decades the capital owners bene…ted from a higher average growth in their non-risky labour income share relative to the risky capital income share (2% versus 0.5% on per year).
In addition to the equity premium, we look at the impact of changes in income shares on other asset pricing variables. Table 7 shows the …gures for Sharpe ratio, log price-dividend ratio, volatility of log-price-dividend ratio and volatility of dividend growth. * denotes an increase in capital share of income and *, an increase in the labour share of income of capital owners. The equity premium in the model is computed over 1.000.000 simulated periods. All the perimeters of the model except for the indicated ones are set to the baseline calibration values reported in Tables 2 and 3. The second row shows the statistics under counterfactual with only shifting by 6 percentage points. We see that there is no impact on Sharpe ratio because increase in capital share of income raises both the return and the volatility of return on capital.
Because changes in labour income share of capital owners have an impact only on the stock return, we …nd that an increase in generates a drop in Sharpe ratio.
Alternative scenarios and predictions
How will the equity premium change by 2030 if the U.S. income inequality continues to increase? While it may be futile to try to predict income inequality changes, it is still of interest to study the most likely scenarios. Recent research suggests that, at least to some extent, the current trends will persist. Schwabish and Topoleski (2013) argue that the historical pattern of rising earnings inequality will continue for the next two decades. Piketty (2014) makes a strong claim that the capital income share will continue to grow as well. In line with these predictions, we extrapolate current inequality trends into the future, until 2030. Speci…cally, we assume that capital share of income, ; continues growing at a yearly 0:5%, as observed between 1970 and 2014, on average. We also assume that the total top decile income share, (1 ) + , will grow at the same rate as on average between 1970 and 2014, namely 0:92% per year.
We then compute the resulting labour share of income of top decile, (1 ) . These assumptions imply that labour share of income of top decile increases at 2% per year.
Next, using our model, we calculate the resulting equity premia, for both of these trends continuing simultaneously (scenario 1) as well as for an alternative scenario in which only capital share of income, ; continues increasing in the future (scenario 2). The evolution of the extrapolated income shares is plotted in Figure 3 (1 ) is their total income share. EP stands for equity premium. EP vs B1 stands for equity premium versus baseline 1 and EP vs B2 versus baseline 2. Statistics are computed using model simulations of 1.000.000 periods. All the parameters except for the ones indicated in the table are set to the baseline calibration values reported in Table2. Table 8 reports the parameter values and resulting equity premia in two "baseline" scenarios and two alternative scenarios based on income shares trends extrapolated in the future. The baseline scenarios assume that income shares parameters remain …xed in the future. The …rst baseline scenario (Baseline 1) corresponds to the initial calibration described in Table 2 where we match the stock market and real economy statistics in the post-war U.S. data. The second baseline scenario (Baseline 2) corresponds to the simulation with higher income inequality as observed in the data in 2014, and described in Tables 6 and 7 . The last three columns of Table 8 report the mean equity premium, the di¤erence relative to the …rst baseline and the di¤erence relative to the second baseline scenario.
Unsurprisingly, under alternative Scenario 1 (both income share parameters continue increasing at the rates depicted in Figure 3) , the equity premium would fall to The last row of Table 8 reports the equity premium value under this scenario.
Because we assumed that only capital share of income would keep on increasing, the equity premium would be higher than the historical (baseline 1) equity premium by 0:57 and higher by 1:36 relative to the equity premium between 1970 and 2014.
Counterfactual scenarios
We are also interested in answering the following question: given the predicted trends in income shares, as extrapolated in the previous subsection, what changes in income inequality are required to bring the equity premium to its historical values? Here we assume that labour share of income remains at its 1970 level and we compute the level and implied growth of capital share of income, ; necessary to generate the average post-war equity premium of 7:03% (scenario 3). In scenario 4, we repeat the exercise but this time we aim at the equity premium value in the period between 1947 and 1970, 9:07% (…rst row of Table 9 ). x stands for growth rate in variable x. is capital share of income. (1 ) is labour share of income of top decile and +(1 ) is their total income share. ' to match EP'indicates the annual growth rate in one of the shares needed to match the EP. EP Statistics in the model are computed using model simulations of 1.000.000 periods. All the parameters except for the ones indicated in the table are set to the baseline calibration values reported in Table 2 . EP sample denotes the sample over which the equity premium in the data was computed.
The …rst row of Table 9 shows that if the labour income dispersion stops increasing, the historical equity premium of 7:03% would be reached by 2030 if capital share of income was growing by 1:4% each year, in line with Piketty's (2014) predictions.
If the equity premium was instead, to reach its value from immediately after the war (scenario 4), the capital share of income would need to grow at the annual 4:31% 27 until 2030, an unlikely scenario.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the relationship between income inequality and stock market returns. We develop a general equilibrium model with capital owners who own 100% of the economy's …nancial wealth and workers who consume their labor income and income from risk-free government and corporate bonds. Motivated by recent empirical observation on the high correlation between capital and labour top incomes, capital owners in our model earn high labor income. Since capital owners are the ones who price the risky assets, changes in their both income sources a¤ect the stock market variables.
In the model higher capital share of income increases the share of capital owners' consumption derived from risky source as well as the riskiness of investment. Both mechanisms generate higher equity premium. When the share of capital owners'income derived from the less risky source (labour) increases, the required risk premium drops and so does equity premium.
We calibrate the model to the post-war U.S. economy and simulate it with increased income inequality, as observed in 2014. We …nd that the impact of the labour share of income was quantitatively larger hence we observe a decrease in the equity premium consistent with the data.
We also use our set-up to carry out a number of counterfactual exercises. First we extrapolate current inequality trends into the future and, using the model, predict the potential equity premium. Second, we compute the level and growth in income inequality needed for the equity premium to go back to its historical mean of the post-war period.
If both capital and total income shares of top decile will grow until 2030 at the same rate as between 1970 and 2014, namely 0.5% and 0.92%, respectively, the equity premium would continue decreasing to 6.11% in 2030, 0.92 percentage point lower than historical equity premium of 7.03%. If capital share of income continues to grow at the annual rate of 0.5% and the labour share of income of top decile remains unchanged, the equity premium would be higher than the historical average by 0.57 percentage point.
If we assume that the labour income dispersion stops increasing, we …nd that the historical equity premium would be reached by 2030 if capital share of income was given state and for any realization of the shock. The expectations are computed by numerical quadrature. Given these,Ĩ t K t 1 ; z t ; c t =Ĩ t is treated as an unknown. The solution is then found by solving this equation 14 in 1 unknown using Chris Sims' non-linear equation solver code csolve. 15 The iteration procedure is repeated until the iteration improves the current decision rule at any given state vector by less than some tolerance level, which we set to 10 12 . 1 4 Speci…cally, this equation is the capital Euler equation (20) . 1 5 Available at http://sims.princeton.edu/yftp/optimize.
